Addiction, the Concept of Disorder, and Pathways to Harm: Comment on Levy by Jerome C. Wakefield
www.frontiersin.org May 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 34 | 1
OpiniOn Article
published: 14 May 2013
doi: 10.3389/fpsyt.2013.00034PSYCHIATRY
Levy (2013) argues that “addiction is not a 
brain disease,” an important claim because, 
contrary to common wisdom, believing 
that mental disorders are brain diseases 
apparently increases stigma (Angermeyer 
and Matschinger, 2005; Schomerus et al., 
2012). Levy presupposes the harmful 
dysfunction (HD) analysis of disorder 
(Wakefield, 1992a,b, 1999a,b, 2006): “[A]
n individual suffers from a disorder only 
if they experience a biological dysfunction 
and that dysfunction is harmful, where the 
judgment of harm is made by reference to 
social norms of flourishing” (Levy, p. 11). 
He accepts that addicted individuals have 
substance-induced brain dysfunctions, and 
that when their dysfunctions cause harm 
(e.g., suffering, impairment of agency), 
such individuals are addictively disordered. 
(Note that throughout this commentary, 
consistent with HD and standard psychi-
atric usage, I use “disorder” as a generic term 
for medical pathology, inclusive of Levy’s 
term “disease.”)
Given these preliminary points, why 
does Levy then claim that addictive dis-
orders are not brain diseases? Levy inter-
prets the HD analysis as requiring that, to 
be a disorder, a dysfunction must not only 
cause harm but cause harm “in almost any 
accessible environment” (AAE) (p. 8); “[D]
ysfunction plus impairment is not sufficient 
for disorder, when the impairment is due to 
social conditions that can relatively easily be 
altered” (p. 8). Levy observes that addicts 
sometimes abstain successfully or obtain 
safe, reliable drug access, suffering no harm. 
Thus, addictive disorder is not identifiable 
with brain dysfunction.
Why the AAE? Levy says it “is necessary 
to rule out conditions in which the appro-
priate response to suffering is to alter the 
environment and not to ‘treat’ the person” 
(p. 8). However, whether a condition is a 
disorder or not and whether treatment of 
the condition should be aimed at the per-
son or the environment are two different 
questions. Many disorders are appropri-
ately treated environmentally (e.g., dietary 
restriction in phenylketonuria, lowering 
episode-triggering expressed emotion in 
mentally ill individuals’ families).
Levy struggles with the many common 
disorder attributions that are apparent AAE 
counterexamples. A New Yorker’s pollen 
allergy and Arizona resident’s snake pho-
bia are considered disorders, even if switch-
ing residences would alleviate both harms. 
Levy claims accessibility costs make such 
counterexamples “only apparent”; peanut 
allergies are disorders because “avoiding 
peanuts is, right now, far from costless” (p. 
8). This defense of the AAE raises difficult 
questions about how costs are to be evalu-
ated in deciding whether an environment is 
“easily altered” and an alternative environ-
ment “accessible.” It also potentially renders 
the AAE operationally meaningless because 
virtually any social change entails peanut-
allergy-level costs.
To defend the AAE, Levy cites dyslexia, 
a presumed brain dysfunction impairing 
reading ability: “[I]f it is true that dyslexia 
was not a disease in the pre-literate past, 
because it did not cause an impairment…, 
then it seems that if it were possible cost-
lessly to alter the environment so that it did 
not cause an impairment in sufferers today, 
it would not count as a disease today” (p. 
9). Levy is not arguing that dyslexia is not a 
disorder today; rather, he is arguing that, as 
the AAE predicts, if there existed a costless 
way to alter the environment and eliminate 
dyslexia’s harm today, then, as in pre-liter-
ate times, dyslexia would not be a disorder 
today, either. This argument’s appeal as a 
defense of the AAE turns on an equivoca-
tion between actual versus  counterfactual 
harmlessness. Pre-literate dyslexia was 
actually harmless, thus non-disordered; 
and if costless environmental changes were 
implemented that rendered dyslexia actu-
ally harmless today, then dyslexia would 
again be non-disordered. However, the 
AAE asserts the stronger claim that, if cost-
less alterations to render dyslexia harmless 
did exist today, then even if they were not 
implemented and dyslexia remained quite 
harmful in our reading-demanding society, 
dyslexia would still not be a disorder simply 
because the possibility of such costless alter-
ations means that an “easily accessible (pos-
sible) environment” would exist in which 
dyslexia would not be harmful. Nothing 
about pre-literate dyslexia’s status implies 
this counterintuitive conclusion that just 
the possibility of costlessly eliminating a 
dysfunction’s harm means that the dysfunc-
tion while it continues to cause harm is not 
a disorder. Our intuitive “disorder” concept 
that tracks actual harmful biological dys-
functions requiring our attention seems 
essentially abandoned by the AAE.
Nonetheless, the AAE suggests an impor-
tant truth about the “harm” component 
of “disorder”: the social judgment that a 
condition is harmful may be based on mis-
guided social values, and deeper judgments 
about what serves justice in the long run can 
override superficial harm judgments and 
thus negate disorder attributions. To this 
extent, my (1992) claim that harm is judged 
by social values was overly simplistic. For 
example, imagine that runaway slaves and 
Soviet dissidents (both claimed by respec-
tive social authorities to be disordered) had 
minor brain dysfunctions that made them 
less tolerant of oppression and more free-
dom-aspiring than others. These groups’ 
actions were socially judged as harmful by 
their societies, potentially justifying a dis-
order diagnosis if dysfunctions did exist. 
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Levy does), one might argue that  addictive 
 disorders are dysfunctions of agency 
(Wakefield, 2009). If such dysfunctions of 
agency mediate between brain dysfunc-
tions and symptoms, and if dysfunctions 
of agency best explain addictive symptoms, 
then one might argue that the addict’s brain 
dysfunction is indeed only a risk factor for 
disorder, not the addictive disorder itself.
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However, the attributions of harm were 
misjudgments (in our view and in the views 
of enlightened contemporaries) because the 
slaves’ and dissidents’ supposedly socially 
harmful actions were in fact warranted steps 
toward justice. Thus, even if they had such 
dysfunctions, no relevant harm and thus no 
disorder existed. The HD “harm” compo-
nent, being normative, reflects deliberation 
about broader normative commitments, 
not just immediate social reactions. This 
seems close to Levy’s point: “[A]ddiction 
may not count as a disease because the suf-
fering it causes is very largely due to social 
conditions that are, in some sense, optional” 
(p. 11). However, Levy stops short of attrib-
uting all addictive harm to social injustice.
Levy attempts to illustrate the usefulness 
of the AAE with an imagined example in 
which homosexuality turns out to be caused 
by a dysfunction, but still, he suggests, the 
AAE saves homosexuality from being a dis-
order because the harm is due to changeable 
socially oppressive attitudes. The example 
is problematic because, although hor-
rifically oppressed, homosexuality’s pur-
ported harms justifying disorder attribution 
included features unrelated to oppression, 
such as the impossibility of having mutual 
biological children with the person one 
loves. The argument also falters if oppres-
sive attitudes are not easily altered, as Levy 
admits. The process by which homosexu-
ality actually did become depathologized 
illustrates not an appeal to the AAE but 
rather the sort of theoretical interaction 
of HD-harm with broader moral theory 
described above. Psychiatrists avoided the 
incendiary issue of whether homosexual-
ity is caused by a dysfunction and instead 
overrode the traditional reproductive-harm 
value claim, arguing that what really mat-
ters from a values perspective is capacity for 
loving human relationships. Homosexual 
and heterosexual individuals are on all 
fours regarding this normative criterion 
for psychosexual health. Unlike the AAE, 
the value-theory-based approach allows 
depathologization of homosexuality even 
in circumstances of difficult-to-change atti-
tudes or other costs.
Without the AAE, addictive disorders 
might be brain diseases even if brain dysfunc-
tions only sometimes cause harm. Compare 
“addiction is a brain disease” with “tuber-
culosis is an infectious disease.” The latter is 
true, yet few people infected with tubercu-
losis develop disease because most people’s 
immune responses contain the infection. 
So, why is tuberculosis an infectious dis-
ease rather than, say, a disease of immune 
response in which the immune system does 
not successfully fight off the infection? The 
answer is that there is no known immune 
dysfunction in people who succumb to 
tuberculosis. The outcome seems due to an 
interaction of the infection with normal vari-
ations in immune system functioning. The 
individuation of the disorder is determined 
by the dysfunction (in this case the infec-
tion) that plays the largest role in explain-
ing the symptoms, even when the disease 
occurs in only a minority of those with the 
dysfunction. Analogously, causal pathways to 
addictive disorders may involve an interac-
tion between explanatory brain dysfunctions 
plus individual and environmental potenti-
ating factors that are normal variations, thus 
making addiction a brain disorder.
However, a dysfunction that initiates the 
pathway to symptoms can be a risk factor 
for disorder rather than a disorder itself, 
if another dysfunction mediates between 
the initiating dysfunction and the ultimate 
symptoms, and if the mediating dysfunc-
tion better explains the symptoms. For 
example, BRCA-gene mutations increase 
breast cancer risk, but breast cancer is not a 
BRCA-gene disorder because further muta-
tions must occur that directly explain breast 
cancer symptoms. Speculatively, this feature 
of the concept of disorder might suggest a 
different route by which to argue for Levy’s 
conclusion that addictions are not brain dis-
orders. Instead of construing impairment 
of agency as one of addiction’s harms (as 
